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I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly ten years have passed since Congress purported to settle
what was clearly the most controversial intersection of bankruptcy
and labor law since the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code (the
"Code"). In NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco,1 the Supreme Court held
that a business that filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy unilaterally
could reject or modify its collective bargaining agreement without
committing an unfair labor practice. Congress' response to organ-
ized labor's outcry over this decision was swift. In the same year
that the Supreme Court handed down the Bildisco decision, Con-
gress added section 1113 to the Bankruptcy Code.'
1. 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
2. See Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 541(a), 98 Stat. 390, 390-91 (1984) (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 1113 (1988)). Indeed, on the very same day that the Supreme Court handed down its
Bildisco decision, Congressman Rodino introduced a bill, the stated purpose of which was to
"clarify congressional intent with respect to the limited circumstances under which collec-
tive bargaining agreements may be rejected." 130 CONG. REc. 2989 (1984).
Section 1113 of the Code reads as follows:
§ 1113. Rejection of collective bargaining agreements
(a) The debtor in possession, or the trustee if one has been appointed under
the provisions of this chapter, other than a trustee in a case covered by sub-
chapter IV of this chapter and by title I of the Railway Labor Act may assume
or reject a collective bargaining agreement only in accordance with the provi-
sions of this section.
(b)(1) Subsequent to filing a petition and prior to filing an application seek-
ing rejection of a collective bargaining agreement, the debtor in possession or
trustee (hereinafter in this section "trustee" shall include a debtor in posses-
sion), shall-
(A) make a proposal to the authorized representative of the employees cov-
ered by such agreement, based on the most complete and reliable information
available at the time of such proposal, which provides for those necessary mod-
ifications in the employees benefits and protections that are necessary to per-
mit the reorganization of the debtor and assures that all creditors, the debtor
and all of the affected parties are treated fairly and equitably; and
(B) provide, subject to subsection (d)(3), the representative of the employees
with such relevant information as is necessary to evaluate the proposal.
(2) During the period beginning on the date of the making of a proposal
provided for in paragraph (1) and ending on the date of the hearing provided
for in subsection (d)(1), the trustee shall meet, at reasonable times, with the
authorized representative to confer in good faith in attempting to reach mutu-
ally satisfactory modifications of such agreement.
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Initially, section 1113 was viewed as a victory for organized la-
bor.3 Before long, however, commentators began questioning
whether the new Code provision was indeed nothing more than a
(c) The court shall approve an application for rejection of a collective bar-
gaining agreement only if the court finds that-
(1) the trustee has, prior to the hearing, made a proposal that fulfills the
requirements of subsection (b)(1);
(2) the authorized representative of the employees has refused to accept
such proposal without good cause; and
(3) the balance of the equities clearly favors rejection of such agreement.
(d)(1) Upon the fling of an application for rejection the court shall schedule
a hearing to be held not later than fourteen days after the date of the filing of
such application. All interested parties may appear and be heard at such hear-
ing. Adequate notice shall be provided to such parties at least ten days before
the date of such hearing. The court may extend the time for the commence-
ment of such hearing for a period not exceeding seven days where the circum-
stances of the case, and the interests of justice require such extension, or for
additional periods of time to which the trustee and representative agree.
(2) The court shall rule on such application for rejection within thirty days
after the date of the commencement of the hearing. In the interests of justice,
the court may extend such time for ruling for such additional period as the
trustee and the employees' representative may agree to. If the court does not
rule on such application within thirty days after the date of the commence-
ment of the hearing, or within such additional time as the trustee and the
employees' representative may agree to, the trustee may terminate or alter any
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement pending the ruling of the
court on such application.
(3) The court may enter such protective orders, consistent with the need of
the authorized representative of the employee to evaluate the trustee's propo-
sal and the application for rejection, as may be necessary to prevent disclosure
of information provided to such representative where such disclosure could
compromise the position of the debtor with respect to its competitors in the
industry in which it is engaged.
(e) If during a period when the collective bargaining agreement continues in
effect, and if essential to the continuation of the debtor's business, or in order
to avoid irreparable damage to the estate, the court, after notice and a hearing,
may authorize the trustee to implement interim changes in the terms, condi-
tions, wages, benefits, or work rules provided by the collective bargaining
agreement. Any hearing under this paragraph shall be scheduled in accordance
with the needs of the trustee. The implementation of such interim changes
shall not render the application for rejection moot.
(f) No provision of this title shall be construed to permit a trustee to unilat-
erally terminate or alter any provisions of a collective bargaining agreement
prior to compliance with the provisions of this section.
11 U.S.C. § 1113 (1988).
3. See, e.g., Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 791 F.2d 1074, 1087
(3d Cir. 1986) (noting that the version of § 1113 which ultimately was passed responded to
workers' concerns over the Bildisco decision).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
dressed-up version of the most central holdings in the very case
that it was thought to overrule.4 After nearly a decade and dozens
of cases, the debate concerning section 1113 is far from settled.
Neither the courts nor scholars can agree about what Congress m-
tended to accomplish with section 1113. Similarly, courts still have
not arrived at a consensus concerning how they ought to interpret
that section's nebulous standards for allowing a Chapter 11 com-
pany's rejection of a collective bargaining agreement.5
As section 1113 approaches its tenth anniversary, a fresh source
of controversy concerning that Code provision has emerged in the
case law. Bankruptcy courts and federal appellate courts have not
been able to agree on the answers to two fundamental questions
under section 1113: first, whether a court-approved rejection of a
collective bargaining agreement creates a cognizable claim m bank-
ruptcy for the union workers whose rights were protected by the
agreement;6 and second, whether a Chapter 11 company that
neither rejects its collective bargaining agreement nor complies
with it creates a superpriority claim in bankruptcy for any worker
rights that are provided for under the agreement.7
In addition to these two new sources of controversy under sec-
tion 1113, courts continue to struggle with the fundamental issue
of when the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement is "nec-
essary" to permit a Chapter 11 debtor's reorganization.8 This Arti-
cle is the first to examine the new uncertainties that have emerged
in recent case law concerning section 1113. The Article is also the
only attempt thus far to consider the "necessary to reorganization"
standard of section 1113 within a broader economic perspective.
Part II of the Article briefly discusses the events that led to the
enactment of section 1113. Part III explores the case law interpret-
4. See Mitchell Rait, Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements Under Section 1113
of the Bankruptcy Code: The Second Circuit Enters the Arena, 63 AM. BANKI L.J. 355,
363-64 (1989) (noting the irony that whereas § 1113 was thought to overrule Bildisco, it
may in fact have codified Bildisco's impact on labor relations); see also Anne J. McClain,
Note, Bankruptcy Code Section 1113 and the Simple Rejection of Collective Bargaining
Agreements: Labor Loses Again, 80 GEo. L.J. 191, 191 (1990) (contending that § 1113 "has
actually placed laborers in a worse position than before its enactment").
5. See infra text accompanying notes 30-110.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 144-64.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 165-204.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 114-43.
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ing the various requirements that must be met by a Chapter 11
debtor who seeks to reject its collective bargaining agreement. Part
IV then considers some procedural and subsidiary issues that have
arisen under section 1113. Part V examines in detail the major un-
settled questions under section 1113 and suggests for each a frame-
work within which courts might solve these remaining puzzles. The
Article concludes by questioning whether one can justify the need
for section 1113 in a world in which union workers possess, in any
event, the leverage created by their right to strike.
II. THE WORLD BEFORE SECTION 1113
It is perhaps easy to forget that prior to 1984, the Bankruptcy
Code arguably was already equipped to handle the issue of
whether a Chapter 11 debtor could reject a collective bargaining
agreement in bankruptcy. Even though section 1113 did not yet
exist, the Code did include section 365, a provision that handles
the issue of executory contracts m bankruptcy 9 The generally ac-
cepted definition of an executory contract is a contract m which
nontrivial performance remains on both sides.10 An unexpired col-
lective bargaining agreement certainly meets that definition.
The fighting issue prior to section 1113's enactment, however,
was not so much whether a collective bargaining agreement was
indeed an executory contract. The question, rather, was how much
the normal standard for allowing a debtor to reject an executory
9. See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1988).
10. The Bankruptcy Code itself does not define just what constitutes an executory con-
tract. Professor Vern Countryman, m his famous article, defined an executory contract as "a
contract under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party to the con-
tract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance would con-
stitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other." Vern Countryman, Execu-
tory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973). Michael Andrew
has proposed a slightly different definition of an executory contract. Andrew defines an ex-
ecutory contract as consisting of two necessary components: "(a) debtor and non-debtor
each have unperformed obligations, and (b) the debtor, if it ceased further performance,
would have no right to the other party's continued performance." Michael T. Andrew, Exec-
utory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding "Rejection", 59 U. COLo. L. REv. 845, 893
(1988).
1994]
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contract ought to vary in a case involving the special executory
contract that was embodied in a collective bargaining agreement.11
A. The Pre-Bildisco Case Law
Prior to the enactment of section 1113, the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA)12 provided, as it still does today, that existing
labor agreements can be modified or terminated only through a
process involving notice and bargaining. Specifically, section 8(d)
of the NLRA prohibits employers from unilaterally terminating or
modifying a collective bargaining agreement.'3 If an employer at-
tempts to effect a unilateral termination or modification, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB) may begin proceedings to
enforce the provisions of the NLRA. 14
Thus, prior to the enactment of section 1113, bankruptcy courts
faced an interesting dilemma when a Chapter 11 debtor attempted
to reject a collective bargaining agreement unilaterally On the one
hand, nothing about a bankruptcy filing would appear to negate
section 8(d)'s prohibition against unilateral rejections of labor
agreements. On the other hand, if the filing of a Chapter 11 case
creates a new legal entity, then the Chapter 11 debtor may qualify
as a "successor employer" to whom the prohibition against modifi-
cation does not apply
In sorting through these considerations, federal circuit courts
prior to Bildisco generally fell into two camps. One view was that
even if the Chapter 11 debtor qualified as a successor employer,
the debtor could reject a collective bargaining agreement only
when it could show that such a rejection was necessary to avoid a
11. See Local Unions v. Brada Miller Freight Sys., Inc. (In re Brada Miller Freight Sys.,
Inc.), 702 F.2d 890, 901 (11th Cir. 1983); Local Joint Executive Bd. v. Hotel Circle, Inc., 613
F.2d 210, 212-14 (9th Cir. 1980).
12. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
13. Id. § 158(d); see also Champion Parts Rebuilders, Inc. v. NLRB, 717 F.2d 845, 852
(3d Cir. 1983).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d); see also Taylor v. NLRB, 786 F.2d 1516, 1520 (11th Cir. 1986)
(noting the NLRB's exclusive jurisdiction to decide unfair labor practices). There is, how-
ever, one qualification to the NLRA's prohibition against unilateral terminations or modifi-
cations of collective bargaining agreements. A successor employer is not bound by a labor
agreement entered into by previous management and thus may unilaterally terminate or
modify such an agreement without violating § 8(d). NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., Inc.,
406 U.S. 272, 287-88 (1972).
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liquidation.15 As might be expected, this view was embraced by la-
bor unions and disavowed by management.16
The standard articulated by the opposing group of cases was
more sympathetic to the possibility of rejection by the debtor.
Those decisions held that a Chapter 11 debtor could reject a col-
lective bargaining agreement in bankruptcy, not only if it was nec-
essary to avoid liquidation, but also when a court balanced the eq-
uities on both sides and found rejection appropriate under the
circumstances. 7
Interestingly, no circuit court adopted the view that the debtor's
rejection of a collective bargaining agreement should be subject to
the same business judgment standard applicable to the usual exec-
utory contract under section 365. Even the courts whose decisions
were more sympathetic to management did not believe that a col-
lective bargaining agreement should be subject to rejection as read-
ily as any other executory contract.
B. The Bildisco Decisin
The controversy came to a head in 1984 when the Supreme
Court agreed to hear a typical labor contract rejection case. In
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco,i s the bankruptcy court allowed a
building supplies distributor that had filed Chapter 11 to reject its
collective bargaining agreement that was in place at the time of its
bankruptcy filing.
The Supreme Court's Bildisco decision had four key compo-
nents. First, the Court made it clear that collective bargaining
15. See Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164, 169
(2d Cir.) (holding that rejection of a collective bargaining agreement could only be approved
after a finding by the court that adherence to the agreement would thwart efforts to save a
failing company in bankruptcy from collapse), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975).
16. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 524 (1984).
17. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. IML Freight, Inc., 789 F.2d 1460, 1462 (10th
Cir. 1986) (articulating the pre-1113 standard for rejection as requiring not simply that per-
formance of the labor contract as written would result in liquidation of the debtor, but that
the court must also consider consequences of liquidation for the debtor, the effect of per-
formance or rejection on creditors' claims, and the impact of rejection on employees); Local
Unions v. Brada Miller Freight Sys., Inc. (In re Brada Miller Freight Sys., Inc.), 702 F.2d
890 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that rejection of the collective bargaining agreement would be
permitted if the debtor could show that the agreement burdened the estate and that the
balance of the equities favored rejection).
18. 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
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agreements were indeed executory contracts that were subject ini-
tially to analysis under Bankruptcy Code section 365.19 In support
of this conclusion the Court noted that section 1167 of the Code
expressly exempted from the coverage of section 365 any collective
bargaining agreements that were subject to the Railway Labor
Act.20 Thus, the Court reasoned, Congress must have intended la-
bor agreements that were not subject to the Railway Labor Act to
be covered under section 365, because Congress clearly knew how
to exclude labor contracts from section 365 when it wished to.21
Having concluded that section 365 covered the rejection of col-
lective bargaining agreements, the Court then defined the standard
by which a Chapter 11 debtor could reject such an agreement. The
Court concluded that such a rejection should be allowed when the
debtor could show that the collective bargaining agreement bur-
dened the estate and that the balance of the equities favored rejec-
tion of the contract.2 2 In adopting this standard, the Court said
that it believed Congress intended the rejection of labor agree-
ments to be governed by a standard higher than the usual business
judgment test under section 365, but not as stringent as the "nec-
essary to avoid liquidation" test that was being used by some of
the lower courts.23
The Court's third and most controversial holding was that a
Chapter 11 debtor, even in the absence of court approval, could
reject unilaterally a collective bargaining agreement without violat-
ing the NLRA.2 4 At least one commentator has complained that
this holding was inconsistent with the Court's first holding that
collective bargaining agreements were within the purview of sec-
tion 365.25
19. Id. at 522.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 526-27.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 532. Whereas the Supreme Court unanimously held that § 365 did govern a
labor contract and that the proper standard for rejection was the balancing of the equities
test, the Court's decision that unilateral rejection was not an unfair labor practice carried
only a 5-4 majority. The majority's rationale for its decision on this score was that from the
filing of the debtor's bankruptcy until formal acceptance of the labor agreement, such an
agreement was not an enforceable contract within the meaning of NLRA § 8(d). Id.
25. Rait, supra note 4, at 361.
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That criticism is misplaced. A unilateral rejection of a labor
agreement by a Chapter 11 debtor may violate section 365, which
requires court approval for rejection of executory contracts. But
that is not the same thing as saying that such a unilateral rejection
violates nonbankruptcy labor law. The NLRA question to which
the Court spoke was in effect whether a Chapter 11 debtor was a
successor employer that would not be bound by the prohibitions of
NLRA section 8(d).26 If one concludes, as the Court did, that a
Chapter 11 debtor is like a successor employer, 27 then it is cer-
tainly possible that a unilateral rejection might contravene the
Bankruptcy Code without violating the NLRA.
The Court's fourth and final important statement in Bildisco
was that prior to allowing rejection of a collective bargaining agree-
ment, a bankruptcy court should be persuaded that the debtor had
made voluntary efforts to negotiate a reasonable modification of its
labor agreement with the union.2 8 This holding, like the Court's
"balance of the equities" standard, managed to make its way into
section 1113, the very provision that the labor community hailed as
reversing the Bildisco outcome.29
III. THE SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS FOR REJECTION
UNDER SECTION 1113
Virtually every court that is faced with the issue of whether a
Chapter 11 debtor may reject its collective bargaining agreement
utilizes a nine-part test that was first set down by the bankruptcy
court in In re American Provision Co.3 0 That test, which is based
on the statutory standards found in section 1113(b) and (c), re-
quires that: (1) the debtor make a proposal to modify the agree-
26. See Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 528.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 526.
29. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(2) (1988) (requiring that during the period between the
debtor's modification proposal to the union and the hearing on rejection the debtor "shall
meet, at reasonable times, with the authorized representative [of the union] to confer in
good faith in attempting to reach mutually satisfactory modifications of such agreement").
30. 44 B.R. 907 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984). A small sample of courts that have used the
American Provision test includes In re GCI, Inc., 131 B.R. 685, 690-91 (Bankr. N.D. Ind.
1991); In re Indiana Grocery Co., 138 B.R. 40, 46-50 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1990); In re Express
Freight Lines, Inc., 119 B.R. 1006, 1011 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1990); and In re Garofalo's Finer
Foods, Inc., 117 B.R. 363, 370 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990).
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ment; (2) the proposal is based on the most complete and reliable
information; (3) the proposed modifications are necessary to per-
mit reorganization; (4) the modifications assure that all creditors,
the debtor, and affected parties are treated fairly and equitably;
(5) the debtor provides to the union such relevant information as is
necessary to evaluate the proposal; (6) the debtor meets at reason-
able times with the union between the time of the proposal and the
time of the hearing on the proposal; (7) the debtor negotiates with
the union in good faith at these meetings; (8) the union refuses to
accept the debtor's proposal without good cause; and (9) the bal-
ance of equities clearly favors rejection of the agreement.3'
What follows is a brief discussion of how the case law has fleshed
out each of these elements. A discussion of the third element,
which requires that the debtor's proposed modifications be neces-
sary to permit the reorganization of the debtor, is reserved for Part
V
A. Debtor Must Make a Proposal to Modify
Three points are worth emphasizing about this initial require-
ment of the American Provision test. First, the debtor's proposal
to modify must relate to the collective bargaining agreement that
is currently in force rather than to a successor agreement that will
arise when the current one ends.3 2 Thus, any negotiations in bank-
ruptcy that relate to the terms of a labor contract that is not yet in
existence will not be affected by the requirements of section 1113.33
Second, a timing issue affects the debtor's required proposal to
modify its labor agreement. The debtor's proposal has to be made
after the debtor has filed for Chapter 11 but before the point when
the debtor goes to court seeking rejection of the agreement.34 This
31. American Provision, 44 B.R. at 909.
32. See In re Valley Kitchens, Inc., 52 B.R. 493, 497 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985) (rpefusmg to
allow the debtor's rejection of a labor contract in part because the proposals made to the
union were in connection with negotiations of a new collective bargaining agreement, not to
modify the existing agreement).
33. See In re Sullivan Motor Delivery, Inc., 56 B.R. 28, 29 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1985) (hold-
ing that when the debtor's collective bargaining agreement expires prior to bankruptcy,
§ 1113 will have no application).
34. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1) (1988) (requiring the debtor's proposal to be made




means that any proposals that the debtor made prior to its filing
for bankruptcy cannot count as the proposal that is required to be
made under section 1113.
Finally, one bankruptcy court held that the required proposal to
modify does not necessarily need to be made by the debtor itself
where the only hope for reorganization is the sale of the company
to a new owner. In In re Maxwell Newspapers, Inc.,35 the court
determined that the required proposal to modify under section
1113 could be made by the party who was negotiating to purchase
the debtor's business.3 6 The bankruptcy court held that this was
sufficient to meet the section 1113 requirement when, as here, the
debtor's sole attempt at survival involved the sale of the business
to this potential purchaser.
3 7
B. Proposal Must Be Based on Recent Information
Courts have tended to merge this second requirement of the
American Provision test with the fifth, which requires that the
debtor provide to the union any information that is necessary to
evaluate the debtor's modification proposal. Although unions do
not frequently invoke these two information requirements as a bar-
rier to the debtor's rejection, the requirements have nevertheless
proven outcome determinative in a few cases.
In more than one case, bankruptcy courts have found it insuffi-
cient for the debtor to simply attach its bankruptcy schedules to
its modification proposal as a means of providing the required in-
formation.' First, these bankruptcy schedules can be well out of
date by the time of the modification proposal.4 ° Another problem
with these schedules is that they are prepared by the debtor itself.
35. 146 B.R. 920 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 149 B.R. 334 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 981 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992).
36. Id. at 929.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., In re Carey Transp., Inc., 50 B.R. 203, 207 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd sub
nom. Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transp., Inc., 816 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1987).
39. See, e.g., In re George Cindnch Gen. Contracting, Inc., 130 B.R. 20, 23-24 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1991); In re K & B Mounting, Inc., 50 B.R. 460, 467-68 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1985).
40. See George Cindrich, 130 B.R. at 24 (noting that the only information given by the
debtors were bankruptcy schedules which were 14 months old at the time of the proposal
and that the union had no reason to assume that such old information was still valid and
relevant to the currently proposed modifications to the collective bargaining agreement).
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Courts are much more comfortable with projections and informa-
tion that are provided by independent consultants.41
One case held that the debtor had not met its duty to provide
adequate information where the debtor failed to mention to the
union that its modification proposal ultimately would involve the
layoff of about one-third of the union work force.42 On the other
hand, the debtor is not required to provide a cost estimate for any
modification counterproposals made by the union.4 Finally, if the
debtor fears that the information it is required to supply involves
trade secrets or other confidential material, the bankruptcy court
can provide a protective order to help ensure that the information
is not disseminated beyond the union's representatives. 44
C. Proposal Must Treat All Parties Fairly and Equitably
This fairly important requirement has tended to raise two major
issues in the case law. The first is whether this requirement man-
dates that the debtor's proposal provide for a pro rata sharing of
burdens.45 Specifically, unions have argued that this requirement
means that any cuts proposed to union salaries must be matched
in kind by reductions in the compensation of owners and nonunion
workers as well as by reductions in the returns to unsecured
creditors.46
41. See K & B Mounting, 50 B.R. at 467 (suggesting that instead of providing merely its
bankruptcy schedules, debtor would be well advised to give projections or recommendations
from a management consultant, preferably an independent consultant).
42. In re Fiber Glass Indus., 49 B.R. 202, 207 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1985).
43. See In re Salt Creek Freightways, 47 B.R. 835, 839 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985).
44. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(d)(3) (1988).
The court may enter such protective orders, consistent with the need of the
authorized representative of the employee to evaluate the trustee's proposal
and the application for rejection, as may be necessary to prevent disclosure of
information provided to such representative where such disclosure could com-
promise the position of the debtor with respect to its competitors in the mdus-
try in which it is engaged.
Id., see also K & B Mounting, 50 B.R. at 467 (reminding the debtor that the court can enter
a protective order if the debtor wishes to prevent disclosure of information by the union to
the debtor's competitors).
45. See, e.g., In re Blue Diamond Coal Co., 131 B.R. 633, 645 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1991).
46. See Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transp., Inc., 816 F.2d 82, 90-91 (2d Cir. 1987);




Courts generally have not been sympathetic to the strict inter-
pretation of parity that has been espoused by unions.47 Rather,
they have been quick to point out that sometimes only the union
wages, and not the salaries of the debtor's workers generally, are
above market at the time of bankruptcy 48 Furthermore, cases have
highlighted the risk that the debtor will lose many of its talented
nonunion employees if it is forced to impose nonunion pay reduc-
tions that mirror those cuts proposed for the union.49 Finally,
courts have noted in some cases that managers who were not
forced to take a pay cut nevertheless assumed additional responsi-
bilities as a way of shouldering their fair share of the burden of
reorganization.5
The second major issue that has arisen under the "fair and equi-
table" requirement is whether a debtor's proposal must include a
"snap-back" provision. Essentially, a snap-back provision is a
clause m a collective bargaining agreement that says if the debtor's
earnings reach a certain level in the future, any cuts that were
made to union wages can "snap back" to their previous level.
Unions have contended that the absence of a snap-back provi-
sion in the debtor's proposal for modification automatically pre-
cludes the proposal from being "fair and equitable. '51 While courts
will consider the absence of a snap-back clause as one factor in
assessing the "fair and equitable" requirement, almost all courts
have held that the absence of a snap-back clause is not necessarily
fatal to the debtor's proposal for modifications.2
47. See Carey, 816 F.2d at 90-91; Blue Diamond, 131 B.R. at 645; Walway, 69 B.R. at
974; cf. In re Indiana Grocery Co., 138 B.R. 40, 48 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1990) (noting that part
of meeting the "fair and equitable" requirement is showing that the creditors are bearing a
fair share of the burden of ensuring a successful reorganization, because they are parties
who stand to benefit from a reorganization). But see In re William P Brogna & Co., 64 B.R.
390, 392 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986) (holding that the debtor's proposal was not fair and equita-
ble to all parties where the proposal would repay all unsecured creditors m full over three
years but would at the same time cut union workers' wages by 41%).
48. See, e.g., Carey, 816 F.2d at 90-91.
49. See, e.g., Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 791 F.2d 1074,
1091-93 (3d Cir. 1986).
50. See, e.g., Carey, 816 F.2d at 90-91.
51. See Walway, 69 B.R. at 974.
52. See Colorado Iron Workers Pension Fund. v. Sierra Steel Corp. (In re Sierra Steel
Corp.), 88 B.R. 314, 317 (D. Colo. 1987) (stating that the inclusion of a snap-back provision
is merely one factor in the determination of whether the debtor's proposal is fair and equi-
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One can easily see why the courts have been reluctant to adopt
the plea of unions for mandatory snap-back provisions. Nothing is
magic about a snap-back provision. It is simply one vehicle by
which union workers receive a more attractive compensation pack-
age. But so, too, are higher wages from the start. Whether a snap-
back provision ends up being more attractive to a worker than a
slightly higher wage that is not contingent on future events will
simply be a function of a worker's risk aversion. 3
Granted, a snap-back provision has the visceral appeal of "shar-
ing the wealth" when the reorganizing company ends up perform-
ing better than expected. Yet, so do employee stock options. But
nobody is suggesting that a debtor's proposal for modification must
include employee stock options or else fail the "fair and equitable"
test. If unions place a high value on snap-back provisions, they cer-
tainly can bargain for them with the debtor during the mandatory
negotiation sessions of section 1113. Bargaining for such provi-
sions, however, should not necessarily mean getting them in addi-
tion to whatever wage level is initially proposed by the debtor.
D. Debtor Must Bargain with the Union in Good Faith
Courts generally have construed as a single element the sixth
and seventh requirements of the American Provision test, which
require that the debtor meet regularly with the union once its
modification proposal is made and that the debtor bargain in good
faith during these meetings.54 In striving to meet this element,
debtors should realize that courts are impressed by the frequency
table to all parties); Walway, 69 B.R. at 974 (rejecting the union's argument that the ab-
sence of a snap-back provision makes the debtor's proposal not fair and equitable and ad-
ding that there is no authority requiring that a union's snap-back proposal be accepted by
the debtor). But see Wheeling-Pittsburgh, 791 F.2d at 1093 (holding that because the
debtor's proposal lacked a snap-back provision, the "fair and equitable" requirement was
not met).
53. Presumably, a risk-preferring worker would choose a slightly lower wage at the start
with the chance that wages would increase if the company performed better than expected.
Conversely, a risk-averse worker probably would choose slightly higher wages at the outset
rather than gamble on still higher wages in the future if certain unpredictable events were
to occur.
54. See In re Salt Creek Freightways, 47 B.R. 835, 839 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985).
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with which the debtor meets with its union.5s Indeed, one court
held specifically that the "good faith" element should be measured
objectively rather than subjectively 56 In applying an objective test
to the debtor's good faith in negotiations, a court would be hard-
pressed to avoid considering the total number of meetings that
were held between the debtor and the umon.
Although section 1113 speaks only of the debtor's duty to bar-
gain in good faith, some courts have inferred a comparable duty on
the part of the union.5 7 At least one commentator has criticized the
courts' creation of this corresponding duty on the part of the
union, arguing that a strict interpretation of section 1113 cannot
justify putting the good faith burden on any party but the
debtor.5" On the other hand, the requirement that the union's re-
jection of the debtor's proposal be "without good cause" suggests
that the union, and not just the debtor, has an independent duty
to negotiate fairly
E. Union Must Reject the Debtor's Proposal Without Good
Cause
Some commentators have suggested that no independent signifi-
cance inures to the requirement that the union must reject the
debtor's proposal without good cause. 9 Whether or not this re-
quirement is completely redundant of the other prerequisites for
rejection of the labor contract, no one can question that the courts
strictly construe the phrase "good cause" when a union rejects the
debtor's proposal.60
55. See, e.g., Walway, 69 B.R. at 973 (holding that the debtor's frequent meetings with
the unon helped to show the debtor's good faith bargaining under § 1113); see also Janell
M. Kurtz et al., Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements in Bankruptcy: A Review,
Update, and Guide for Debtors, 96 Com. L.J. 31, 40 (1991) (suggesting that a debtor would
be wise to hold at least two collective bargaining sessions between submitting the proposal
to the umon and the hearing on rejection in order for the debtor to fulfill the requirement of
meeting at reasonable times).
56. In re GCI, Inc., 131 B.R. 685, 693 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1991).
57. See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. Mile Hi Metal Sys. (In re Mile Hi Metal
Sys.), 899 F.2d 887, 892 (10th Cir. 1990); GCI, 131 B.R. at 692.
58. See McClain, supra note 4, at 202.
59. Id. at 203-04; see also Kurtz et al., supra note 55, at 42.
60. McClain, supra note 4, at 204.
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More than one court has refused to accept as good cause for re-
jection the effect that the debtor's proposal would have on other
union contracts that were not before the court. 1 In In re Sierra
Steel Corp.,62 a clause in other labor agreements of the union bar-
gaining in bankruptcy provided that the union would bargain for
equal wage treatment across employers. This meant that if the
debtor's modifications were accepted, then union employees of
nonbankrupt companies would end up receiving the same wage cut
as that contained in the debtor's proposal. Nevertheless, the court
held that "good cause" must be interpreted narrowly to encompass
the effect of the proposed modifications solely on the specific case
before the bankruptcy court.63
Even a debtor's proposal to ignore a collective bargaining agree-
ment's lifetime job guarantees for certain union workers has been
held insufficient to constitute "good cause" for the union's rejec-
tion of the proposal.6 4 Doubtless the "rejection without good
cause" requirement has ended up helping the debtor rather than
the union.
The Second Circuit, in fact, opined in New York Typographical
Union No. 6 v. Maxwell Newspapers, Inc. (In re Maxwell News-
papers, Inc.) 5 that the purpose of the "good cause" requirement is
to force the union to be flexible in receiving the debtor's modifica-
tion proposals, or else risk a court-sanctioned total rejection of the
collective bargaining agreement. 66
Even the "good cause" requirement does not place all of the bar-
gaining onus on the shoulders of the union. The flipside of the
"good cause" requirement in the negotiating dynamic is that the
debtor has to show that its proposed modifications are "necessary"
for a successful reorganization.6
61. See In re Sierra Steel Corp., 88 B.R. 337, 340-41 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988); In re Salt
Creek Freightways, 47 B.R. 835, 841 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985).
62. 88 B.R. 337 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988).
63. Id. at 340-41.
64. In re Blue Diamond Coal Co., 131 B.R. 633, 646 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1991).
65. 981 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992).
66. Id. at 90.




F Rejection Is Favored by a Balance of the Equities
Not much case law exists interpreting the requirement that re-
jection must be favored by the balance of the equities, largely be-
cause this requirement is more or less subsumed into the other
more specific requirements of the American Provision test. The
fact that this requirement gets so little attention in the section
1113 case law is ironic, considering that the "balance of the equi-
ties" concept was borrowed from the Bildisco case itself.6 8
In any event, unions are not likely to find much help in this re-
quirement. One court went so far as to say that the primary ques-
tion under the balance of the equities test is what effect rejection
of the labor agreement will have on the debtor's prospects for reor-
ganization." Certainly some courts might find such a view contrary
to the commonly accepted spirit of section 1113, which purports to
focus on how proposed modifications to the labor agreement will
affect all parties, including union workers. On the other hand, if
the modifications proposed are not sufficient to enable a reorgani-
zation of the debtor, then the union workers probably will lose in
the end anyway
IV PROCEDURAL AND OTHER SUBSIDIARY ISSUES
UNDER SECTION 1113
Much of the case law concerning section 1113 has involved issues
other than the straightforward application of the provision's re-
quirements for the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement in
Chapter 11. For example, courts have faced procedural questions
such as allocating the burden of proof and determining whether
parties acted within the statutorily required time periods.70 Addi-
tionally, section 1113 provides special standards that allow the
debtor to obtain emergency interim relief.71 Finally, the fundamen-
tal question is just what effect a court-approved rejection has on
the continuing relationship between the debtor and the union
whose labor agreement was rejected.7 2
68. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 523-26 (1984).
69. In re Blue Diamond Coal Co., 131 B.R. 633, 647 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1991).
70. See infra text accompanying notes 73-83.
71. See infra text accompanying notes 84-90.
72. See infra text accompanying notes 91-96.
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A. Burden of Proof
Section 1113 does not address expressly the question of which
party, the debtor or the union, has the burden of proof as to rejec-
tion of the collective bargaining agreement. Nevertheless, the
debtor is clearly the moving party and thus the party that will as-
sume the burden of proving the elements necessary for rejection.
As one court observed candidly, a debtor that wishes to win rejec-
tion of the labor agreement must show both that it is without sin
and that the union is at fault. 3 In other words, the issue under
section 1113 is not one of relative behavior; a debtor cannot win
merely by showing that it acted in "better faith" than did the
union.7 4
The discussion does not end, however, merely by observing that
the burden of proof under section 1113 will be the debtor's. Nearly
all courts are in agreement that although the burden of persuasion
as to all nine elements of the American Provision test rests with
the debtor, the burden of production as to certain of those ele-
ments may shift to the union.75 Courts have held that once the
debtor makes its prima facie case for rejection, the union will have
the burden of production as to three of the nine American Provi-
sion elements: (1) whether the union was provided with relevant
information; (2) whether the debtor bargained in good faith; and
(3) whether the union refused to accept the debtor's proposal with-
out good cause."6
Thus, once the debtor brings forward sufficient evidence to sus-
tain a prima facie case for rejection, the union must produce some
evidence to show that it was not provided with relevant informa-
tion, that the debtor did not bargain in good faith, and that the
union's refusal to accept the debtor's modification proposal was
not without good cause. When the union meets its burden of pro-
73. In re GCI, Inc., 131 B.R. 685, 695 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1991).
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., In re Blue Diamond Coal Co., 131 B.R. 633, 643 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1991);
In re Indiana Grocery Co., 138 B.R. 40, 46 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1990); In re Express Freight
Lines, Inc., 119 B.R. 1006, 1011 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1990); In re Garofalo's Finer Foods, Inc.,
117 B.R. 363, 370 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990); In re American Provision Co., 44 B.R. 907, 909-10
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1984).
76. E.g., Blue Diamond, 131 B.R. at 643; Express Freight, 119 B.R. at 1011; Garofalo's,
117 B.R. at 370; American Provision, 44 B.R. at 909-10.
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duction as to these three elements, then the burden of persuasion
by a preponderance of the evidence shifts back to the debtor.
7
B. Timing Issues
The time periods within which the court must rule on applica-
tions for rejection under section 1113 are relatively straightfor-
ward. As noted above, the debtor's proposal for modification must
be made to the union after the debtor's bankruptcy but before the
debtor's application for rejection of the agreement. 8 Section
1113(d) provides that when the debtor files its application to the
court for rejection, the court must hold a hearing on rejection
within fourteen days of the debtor filing the application.7 9 The
court has the discretion to extend the start of such a hearing by
seven additional days when the circumstances merit it, but exten-
sions beyond seven days must be agreed to by both the debtor and
the union.80
The court is then given thirty days from the date of the com-
mencement of the rejection hearing to make a ruling on the
debtor's rejection application.81 Both the debtor and the union
must agree to any extensions of this time period.8 2 If the court fails
to rule on the debtor's application within the statutory time pe-
riod, the debtor is allowed unilaterally to terminate or modify any
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement pending the
court's ruling.83
C. Interim Relief
Occasionally, the Chapter 11 debtor's situation will be such that
it literally cannot afford the time necessary to engage in all of the
required steps under section 1113 in order to modify its collective
bargaining agreement. To account for these more immediate crises,
Congress included a special provision, section 1113(e), that pro-
77. American Provision, 44 B.R. at 910; see also Indiana Grocery, 138 B.R. at 46; Express
Freight, 119 B.R. at 1011; Garofalo's, 117 B.R. at 370.
78. See supra text accompanying note 34.
79. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(d)(1) (1988).
80. Id.
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vides for the possibility of interim modifications to the labor
agreement.8 4
Section 1113(e) articulates a high standard for interim modifica-
tions. Such modifications must be "essential to the continuation of
the debtor's business," or necessary "to avoid irreparable damage
to the estate. '8 5 One court which allowed such interim modifica-
tions bluntly rephrased the standard to the effect that absent the
requested changes, the Chapter 11 company will collapse and the
employees will no longer have jobs.88
Courts have been amenable to using their discretion under sec-
tion 1113(e) to craft interim modifications that may not mirror
precisely those that were requested by the debtor. One court noted
that Congress certainly did not want judges rewriting collective
bargaining agreements on a permanent basis, but nonetheless the
court felt compelled to change the agreement temporarily in re-
sponse to the debtor's request for interim modifications.8 7 Another
court that drafted its own interim modifications was quick to urge
either party to return to the court for further adjustments of the
interim reductions, "[r]ecognizing the inherent fallibility of the
projections" upon which the judge's reductions were based. 8
An important point about section 1113(e) that is sometimes lost
on the two bargaining parties is that any interim modifications
should not cause an interruption in negotiations about any long-
term modifications proposed by the debtor. Section 1113(e) itself
provides that "[t]he implementation of such interim changes shall
not render the application for rejection moot."8 In other words, a
court's allowance of interim changes postpones the larger question
of rejection, but by no means avoids it.90
84. Id. § 1113(e).
85. Id.
86. In re Salt Creek Freightways, 46 B.R. 347, 350 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985).
87. In re Russell Transfer, Inc., 48 B.R. 241, 243-44 (Bankr.. W.D. Va. 1985).
88. In re Evans Prods. Co., 55 B.R. 231, 234 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985).
89. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(e) (1988).
90. See Salt Creek Freightways, 46 B.R. at 351 (reminding parties that the grant of in-




D. Consequences of Rejection
On the surface, a court's authorization of the debtor's rejection
of a collective bargaining agreement seems to translate into a com-
plete victory for the debtor. After all, once a court allows rejection,
the debtor no longer has a collective bargaining agreement about
which to worry While that may be true, even following rejection,
the union will still exist, and that union will remain the exclusive
bargaining representative for its workers, notwithstanding the au-
thorized rejection.
One court that allowed the rejection of the debtor's collective
bargaining agreement under section 1113 took pains to point out
that the debtor's rejection of the agreement by no means signalled
the end of negotiations between the debtor and the union.91
Rather, the court said, the allowance of rejection by the debtor
simply signalled a new phase in the negotiations.92
In this new phase of negotiations, the union certainly has lost
whatever leverage section 1113 gave it with respect to retaining its
pre-existing labor agreement. The union, however, is not without
weapons in its continuing negotiations with the debtor. The
debtor, of course, still needs workers. And the union probably still
retains its right to strike." The question at this point will be sim-
ply whether the two sides can reach an arrangement by which the
workers will work for terms less attractive than those for which
they previously had bargained under the old labor agreement.
Interestingly, one case suggests that a debtor that meets all of
the requirements for rejection under section 1113 will not necessar-
ily end up without a collective bargaining agreement. In In re
91. In re Kentucky Truck Sales, Inc., 52 B.R. 797, 806 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985).
92. Id., see also Salt Creek Freightways, 47 B.R. at 842 (observing that even following an
allowed rejection of a collective bargaining agreement under § 1113, the debtor still had a
continuing duty to negotiate in good faith with the union towards achieving a new labor
contract).
93. The one possible limitation on this right would be Bankruptcy Code § 362, the auto-
matic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988). To the extent that the strike is seeking not just better
conditions going forward but recovery of pre-petition wage claims, there is the argument
that strikmg is a prohibited "act" to collect a pre-petition debt under § 362(a)(6). Cf. Crowe
& Assocs., Inc. v. Bricklayers Union Local No. 2, 20 B.R. 225, 227 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (em-
ployer believed that acceding to its employees' demands to pay pre-petition debts to the
employees would violate the stay), aff'd, 713 F.2d 211 (6th Cir. 1983).
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Garofalo's Finer Foods, Inc.,94 the court concluded that where all
of the requirements for rejection had been met, section 1113 could
be used by the court to effect a mere modification of the collective
bargaining agreement rather than a complete rejection. 9 5 In es-
sence, the court used the debtor's modification proposal that the
union had rejected earlier without good cause as the new agree-
ment. Even though this result was not sanctioned specifically in
section 1113, the court justified its result by pointing to Bank-
ruptcy Code section 105, which grants to the court certain equita-
ble powers.9 6
E. Section 1113 and Retiree Medical Benefits
Collective bargaining agreements commonly include a provision
that guarantees continuing medical benefits for union retirees of
the company 97 One issue facing courts is whether retirees should
be considered "employees" for the purpose of section 1113's pro-
tections. In United Steelworkers v. Unimet Corp. (In re Unimet
Corp.),9 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that retir-
ees were indeed employees for purposes of section 1113's require-
ments.9 Thus, the court said, the Chapter 11 debtor had to keep
paying retiree medical benefits in bankruptcy until there was a
court-approved modification or rejection of the collective bargain-
Ing agreement that was the source of those benefits. 100
In a case decided two years prior to Unimet, In re Century
Brass Products, Inc.,10 the Second Circuit similarly had held that
retirees are considered employees for purposes of section 1113.102 A
related issue in Century Brass was whether, given that the retirees
94. 117 B.R. 363 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990).
95. Id. at 370.
96. Id., see also 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (stating that the bankruptcy court may issue "any
order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of
this title").
97. See Daniel L. Keating, Good Intentions, Bad Economics: Retiree Insurance Benefits
in Bankruptcy, 43 VAND. L. REv. 161, 185-87 (1990).
98. 842 F.2d 879 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 828 (1988).
99. Id. at 885-86.
100. Id. at 883.
101. Century Brass Prods., Inc. v. International Union, United Auto. Workers (In re Cen-
tury Brass Prods., Inc.), 795 F.2d 265 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986).
102. Id. at 275.
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were employees under section 1113, the retirees could be repre-
sented adequately by the current employees. On this question, the
court held that where a retiree party articulates a conflict of inter-
est to the court and the court agrees that a conflict exists, the
court must appoint a separate party to represent the interests of
retirees. 103 One could imagine that a conflict of interest in the
bankruptcy context would almost always be inherent. In a zero-
sum game such as bankruptcy, every dollar used to enhance the
salaries of current workers is one less dollar available for retiree
medical costs, and vice versa.
The holdings of both Unimet and Century Brass were essen-
tially codified in 1988 when Congress added section 1114 to the
Bankruptcy Code.104 Section 1114, which borrows much of its lan-
guage directly from section 1113, prevents a Chapter 11 debtor
from reducing payment of its retiree medical benefits until the
debtor makes a showing that modification of such benefits is neces-
sary to permit the debtor's reorganization. 0 5 Section 1114 also pro-
vides that retirees will have a separate bargaining representative
with whom the debtor must negotiate if the debtor wishes to mod-
ify its retiree medical benefits. 0 6
If all courts accepted the holdings of Unimet and Century Brass,
then section 1114 arguably does not provide much independent
benefit to union retirees whose benefits flow from a collective bar-
gaining agreement. Nevertheless, section 1114 created at least one
new issue for courts to resolve: Which Code section, section 1113 or
section 1114, governs the case in which a Chapter 11 debtor wishes
to modify retiree medical benefits that are included in a collective
bargaining agreement? The issue is significant because although
the standards for modification found in sections 1113 and 1114
show a tremendous overlap, the two standards are not completely
identical.
The relationship between sections 1113 and 1114 was one of
many issues the bankruptcy court faced in In re Ionosphere Clubs,
Inc. 0 7 That court concluded that in a case where retiree medical
103. Id.
104. Pub. L. No. 100-334, § 2(a), 102 Stat. 610, 610-14 (1988).
105. 11 U.S.C. § 1114(e)-(g) (1988).
106. Id. § 1114(c).
107. 134 B.R. 515 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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benefits arguably are covered both by section 1114 and by section
1113, only section 1114 should be applied to determine whether
those benefits can be modified. 108 The court reasoned that in the
absence of any answer in the statutory language or in the legisla-
tive history, the court should proceed to apply the rule of statutory
construction that the more specific statute supersedes the more
general one. 09 In addition, the court noted that "it would be a
waste of resources and a needlessly complicated process to require
compliance with both [section] 1113 and [section] 1114.' ' 1"
V THE OPEN QUESTIONS OF SECTION 1113
Even after nearly ten years of case law interpreting section 1113,
courts continue to struggle with certain issues that arise thereun-
der. For one thing, courts have yet to resolve just what it means to
say that the debtor's proposed modifications must be "necessary"
to permit the reorganization of the debtor."' In addition, recent
case law has uncovered two significant but previously unnoticed
puzzles under section 1113. First, it is not clear whether a debtor's
court-approved rejection under section 1113 gives to union workers
a claim for damages in bankruptcy 112 Second, courts cannot agree
about what should happen to the rights of union workers when the
Chapter 11 debtor neither rejects its collective bargaining agree-
ment in bankruptcy nor complies with it."'
A. Giving Meaning to the "Necessary" Standard
Without question the single most controversial question under
section 1113 has been how to define what modifications are neces-
sary to permit the debtor's reorganization.1 4 Indeed, while the
American Provision nine-part section 1113 test has gained wide ac-
ceptance, a number of courts adopting that test nevertheless will
devote the majority of their opinion to the "necessary" issue.
108. Id. at 519.
109. Id.
110. Id. (footnote omitted).
111. See infra text accompanying notes 114-43.
112. See infra text accompanying notes 144-64.
113. See infra text accompanying notes 165-204.
114. See McClain, supra note 4, at 208-09 (contending that courts have let the "neces-
sary" requirement swallow up all of the other requirements of § 1113).
526 [Vol. 35:503
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
Two important circuit court cases have helped shape the terms
of the debate. On the one side is the Third Circuit and its opinion
in Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel v. United Steelworkers.115 In that
case, the court said that "necessary" in section 1113 means "essen-
tial" and should be construed strictly to allow only those modifica-
tions that are directly related to the Chapter 11 company's finan-
cial condition and its reorganization. 6 The Third Circuit claimed
that Congress intended the word "necessary" to focus on the some-
what shorter-term goal of preventing the debtor's liquidation
rather than on the far-sighted goal of ensuring a long-term
reorganization.11 7
As noted earlier, some courts consider the lack of a snap-back
provision to implicate the "fair and equitable" requirement of sec-
tion 1113.118 The court in Wheeling-Pittsburgh took that position
in holding that the lack of a snap-back provision in the debtor's
five-year modification proposal prevented the proposal from meet-
ing the "necessary" requirement.11 9 Apparently, the Third Circuit
believed that a long-term modification of this sort could not be jus-
tified absent a provision ensuring that workers would end up reap-
mg the benefits of a greater-than-expected future profitability.1 20
In contrast to the Third Circuit's holding in Wheeling-Pitts-
burgh stands the Second Circuit's decision in Truck Drivers Local
807 v. Carey Transportation, Inc.2 1 In Carey, the court took issue
with the Wheeling-Pittsburgh construction of "necessary" in sec-
tion 1113.122 The Second Circuit contended that "necessary"
should not mean "essential" or "bare bones," but instead should
require a proposal made in good faith by the debtor that contains
necessary changes that will enable the debtor to complete the reor-
ganization process successfully 123 Thus, the Carey standard fo-
cused on changes that would ensure the long-term health of the
115. 791 F.2d 1074 (3d Cir. 1986).
116. Id. at 1088.
117. Id. at 1089.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
119. Wheeling-Pittsburgh, 791 F.2d at 1090.
120. See id.
121. 816 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1987).
122. Id. at 89-90.
123. Id. at 89.
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debtor rather than on changes that would simply stave off a liqui-
dation in the short term.
The Second Circuit in Carey made three powerful points sup-
porting its interpretation of "necessary" over the approach set
forth in Wheeling-Pittsburgh. These reasons have helped persuade
the vast majority of courts considering the question that the Carey
standard is the appropriate one to use in the section 1113
context.'24
First, the court in Carey said if a debtor were forced to make a
proposal that included only the absolute minimum changes that
would avoid a liquidation, then the debtor would have no room for
negotiation. 125 This factor is significant because Congress contem-
plated, indeed required, that the debtor would engage in good faith
negotiations with the union after it presented the union with its
modification proposal, but before its application for rejection. 26 If
the debtor's modification proposal could not include any changes
beyond those necessary to avoid a liquidation, then the debtor
would have nothing to offer to give back to the union in these stat-
utorily required negotiation sessions.
The second point involved section 1113(e), the provision that
provides a standard for interim modifications to the debtor's col-
lective bargaining agreement. 12 The Second Circuit noted the
standard for allowing interim modifications under section 1113(e):
The interim changes would be allowed when they were essential to
124. See Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. Mile Hi Metal Sys. (In re Mile Hi Metal
Sys.), 899 F.2d 887, 892-93 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting that most courts have rejected the
Wheeling-Pittsburgh standard and adopted the Carey standard of "necessary," and follow-
ing the majority approach itself); Typographical Union No. 6 v. Royal Composing Room,
Inc. (In re Royal Composing Room, Inc.), 848 F.2d 345, 348 (2d Cir. 1988) (following the
Carey standard and rejecting the union's contention that "necessary" in § 1113 means that
every element of the debtor's modification proposal must itself be independently necessary
for a successful reorganization), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1078 (1989); In re Indiana Grocery
Co., 136 B.R. 182, 192 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1990) (adopting Carey and noting that in order for
labor contract modifications to be shown necessary for a successful reorganization, it need
not be shown that the debtor's problems were caused by the labor agreement as opposed to
some other factor such as slumping sales).
125. Carey, 816 F.2d at 89.
126. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(2) (1988) (requiring that as a prerequisite to rejection the
debtor must meet with the union "to confer in good faith in attempting to reach mutually
satisfactory modifications of such agreement").
127. See id. § 1113(e); see also supra text accompanying notes 84-90.
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the continuation of the debtor's business or were necessary to
avoid irreparable damage to the estate. 128 The problem with the
Wheeling-Pittsburgh approach, the Second Circuit said, was that
its formulation of "necessary" for the debtor's long-term proposal
was essentially indistinguishable from the standard set down by
Congress for mere interim modifications. 129 The court in Carey did
not think that Congress intended the same standard of "neces-
sary" for the debtor's long-term modifications in the labor agree-
ment as Congress specifically set down for any short-term
modifications.130
The court's third reason for refusing to adopt the Wheeling-
Pittsburgh standard of "necessary" involved the Bankruptcy
Code's requirements for confirmation of a plan of reorganization.
Section 1129(a)(11) provides that a court should confirm a plan of
reorganization only if confirmation "is not likely to be followed by
the liquidation, or the need for further financial reorganization, of
the debtor."' If the Wheeling-Pittsburgh standard is taken at
face value, said the Second Circuit, then, most likely, the debtor
could not confirm a plan of reorganization. 3 2 A feasible plan of
reorganization is one that provides a cushion for future emergen-
cies. Where the debtor is allowed to modify its collective bargain-
mg agreement only to the extent of avoiding a short-term liquida-
tion, providing for such a cushion is nearly impossible.
One additional consideration implicates the "necessary" stan-
dard of section 1113, but it is a factor on which no court has yet
focused attention-section 1129's "best interests of creditors"
test.' Essentially, the "best interests" test says that no unsecured
creditor can be forced to accept a Chapter 11 plan unless that plan
provides the creditor with at least as much value as the creditor
would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation of the same company 134
128. Carey, 816 F.2d at 89.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11).
132. Carey, 816 F.2d at 89.
133. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7).
134. See id. (requiring as a prerequisite to confirmation that each impaired claimholder
either accept the proposed plan or "receive or retain under the plan bn account of such
claim or interest property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, that is not less than
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In order to appreciate the effect of this standard on the determi-
nation of what is necessary under section 1113, one first needs to
step back for a moment and remember what a Chapter 11 reorgan-
ization is all about. One of the main functions of a Chapter 11 re-
organization is to preserve the going-concern value of those compa-
nies that are worth more intact than they are piecemeal. 13 5 The
reason that bankruptcy can be a more effective device than state
law at achieving this end is that bankruptcy helps to cure the col-
lective action problem that exists under state law 136
State debtor-creditor law is essentially the law of the swiftest.
Whenever the debtor has fewer assets than it has liabilities, priori-
ties among unsecured creditors generally are determined in the or-
der that creditors bring collection actions. 3 7 Therefore, when
things are looking bleak for the debtor, each individual creditor
has an incentive to institute collection proceedings to recover its
claim. This incentive will exist even where the creditor group as a
whole would be better off if the debtor remained intact instead of
being dismantled asset by asset. Therein lies the collective action
problem. Individual creditors under state law have an incentive to
take actions that are destructive to the creditor group as a whole.
Absent the application of bankruptcy law, the collective action
problem typically will not be resolved for at least two reasons.
First, the group of creditors is often widely dispersed, resulting m
prohibitively high transaction costs for any creditor who might
wish to bring the group together to negotiate a collective solution
to the problem of the debtor's insolvency Second, even if the cred-
itor group can be assembled in one place, any forbearance agree-
ment that might be reached must be unanimous among the credi-
tors. Otherwise, nonconsenting creditors would have no
competition in their individual collection actions against the
the amount that such holder would so receive or retain if the debtor were liquidated under
chapter 7 of this title on such date").
135. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (1977) (stating that the premise of
business reorganization is that a company's assets are worth more as a going concern than
they are if sold for scrap); see also In re Kleinsasser, 12 B.R. 452, 455 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1981)
(contending that "it was the intent of Congress that a debtor be given one meaningful
opportunity to rehabilitate").
136. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON
BANKRUPTCY 39-42 (2d ed. 1990).
137. See id. at 3-25 (providing an overview of state law collection processes).
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debtor, and the collective benefits of forbearance would be reduced
or lost completely
Bankruptcy responds to each of these problems in state law col-
lective actions. First, bankruptcy provides a single forum in which
all creditors must come together to decide the most efficient de-
ployment of the debtor's assets. This feature of bankruptcy re-
sponds to the problem of creditor dispersion and the high transac-
tions costs of meeting to negotiate a settlement. Second,
bankruptcy's automatic stay prevents any individual advantage-
taking once the bankruptcy petition has been filed. l ss The
mandatory nature of bankruptcy gives teeth to its more specific
features. No creditor can opt out of the process, and the only re-
turns available to creditors once the petition is filed are those
through the bankruptcy estate.""9
The Chapter 11 negotiation process itself often will involve allo-
cating the debtor's going-concern surplus.140 The debtor's going-
concern surplus can be defined as the difference between what the
debtor is worth as a going-concern and what the debtor's assets
would be worth if they were liquidated on a piecemeal basis. The
main negotiation regarding allocation of that surplus typically will
occur between the debtor's equity holders and its general un-
secured creditors.14' When a collective bargaining agreement is in
place, effectively a third distinct party must negotiate for a share
of that surplus-the debtor's union workers.
Consider this example of how the debtor's union wage rates af-
fect the negotiation over the debtor's going-concern surplus. Imag-
ine a debtor that is worth $10 million if liquidated piecemeal and
that is worth $9 million as a going-concern. if its collective bargain-
ing agreement is not modified. Suppose that if union wage rates
138. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988).
139. See id. (providing for an automatic stay which prevents any actions by pre-petition
creditors against the debtor or against property of the estate); id. § 524(a)(2) (creating a
post-discharge injunction which prevents any pre-petition creditor from pursuing the debtor
following debtor's discharge in bankruptcy); id. § 726 (providing for distribution of the
property of the estate).
140. See Keating, supra note 97, at 188-95 (describing complications in the process of
negotiating for going-concern surplus).
141. See generally Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall
and the Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CHL L. REV. 738 (1988) (examining
the problems of renegotiation in light of the absolute priority rule).
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were cut by twenty percent, the debtor's going-concern value
would increase to $11 million because of the effect that this reduc-
tion in expenses would have on the debtor's projected annual cash
flow
What section 1113 and its "necessary" standard do not deter-
mine is just how much of a burden the union ought to bear in or-
der to create a going-concern surplus that makes the Chapter 11
reorganization possible. In other words, the unanswered issue is
whether section 1113 is intended to force union workers in the
above hypothetical to accept a wage cut of five percent, twenty
percent, or something in between. The specific words of section
1113 provide neither a baseline nor a ceiling as to the size of con-
cessions that union workers are expected to make.
The best interests of creditors test found in section 1129(a)(7)
can provide at least some guidance. Once again, that important
section requires that each claimholder receive at least as much in
the Chapter 11 plan as the claimant would receive if the debtor
were liquidated under Chapter 7 142 What this means in the above
example is that, at a minimum, union wages must be cut by ten
percent to ensure a going-concern value of at least $10 million. If
the going-concern value were less than $10 million, then unsecured
creditors would end up receiving less in the Chapter 11 plan than
they would if the debtor simply were liquidated. Section
1129(a)(7), then, provides a basis on which a minimum figure for
required union concessions can be calculated.
On the surface, it would appear that the Wheeling-Pittsburgh
test in this example would allow the debtor to make union wage
cuts of no greater than ten percent. A ten percent union wage cut
is the amount that would just meet the "best interests" test and
thus would avert the liquidation that could come from failing to
meet that test. What the Wheeling-Pittsburgh test fails to account
for, however, is that any plan still has to receive the affirmative
vote of claimholders. 14' Thus, if union wages were cut by merely
142. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7).
143. One of the 13 prerequisites to the confirmation of a plan under § 1129(a) is that
each class of "impaired" claims has accepted the plan. Id. § 1129(a)(8). Under the Bank-
ruptcy Code, a class of claims is considered to be "impaired" when its nonbankruptcy enti-
tlements would be altered by the plan. Id. § 1124. "Acceptance" of a plan by a class of
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ten percent, claimholders would be unlikely to vote for confirma-
tion of the Chapter 11 plan.
The problem with a wage cut of just ten percent is that un-
secured creditors would receive none of the going-concern surplus
that Chapter 11 is intended to preserve. Put another way, the
Wheeling-Pittsburgh definition of "necessary" as applied literally
in this hypothetical would make the unsecured creditors as well
off, but no better off, in Chapter 11 than they would be in Chapter
7 The flaw, then, in the bare-bones approach to "necessary" is
that while meeting the "best interests" test may be necessary for a
successful reorganization, it likely will not be sufficient to bring the
debtor out of Chapter 11.
When one considers the realities of the bargaining dynamic in a
Chapter 11 reorganization, specifically the negotiations over alloca-
tion of a debtor's going-concern surplus, the liberal Carey standard
of "necessary" appears to be the more logical approach. The
Carey standard of "necessary," which allows greater cuts in union
wages than merely those absolutely necessary to avoid liquidation,
is more likely to lead to a confirmed plan of reorganization. The
reason that the Carey standard will have this effect is that the
Carey definition of "necessary" is more likely to allocate at least
some of the gains of the debtor's going-concern surplus to the un-
secured creditors who must vote on the debtor's plan of
reorganization.
Even Carey's standard, however, fails to answer the more funda-
mental question of just how much of the debtor's going-concern
surplus ought to be captured by the union workers and how much
should be captured by unsecured creditors. Whereas section
1129(a)(7)'s "best interests" test demands of the union that the
creditors requires an affirmative vote by at least two-thirds in amount and one-half in num-
ber of the allowed claims of such class held by creditors. Id. § 1126(c).
Even if a class of claims votes against a plan, the plan still can be confirmed under
§ 1129(b), the "cramdown" procedures of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. § 1129(b). For a plan to
be crammed down over the dissenting votes of a class of creditors, however, § 1129(b) re-
quires that a number of conditions be met. First, all of the other twelve requirements for the
confirmation of a plan in § 1129(a) must be satisfied, including the "best interests" test of
§ 1129(a)(7) that was noted earlier. Id. Furthermore, § 1129(b)(2)(B) provides that no plan
can be confirmed over the "no" vote of a dissenting class unless the plan provides for that
class to be paid in full or no junior class receives anything. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(B). This provi-
sion is known as the "absolute priority rule."
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unsecured creditors at least break even in Chapter 11, Carey sug-
gests that the union must accept modifications that make the un-
secured creditors somewhat better off than they would be in a liq-
uidation of the debtor. Precisely how much better off the
unsecured creditors must be made, and at what cost to the union
workers whose wage cuts are enabling that result, are two ques-
tions that the word "necessary" and all of its interpretations thus
far have yet to fully resolve.
B. Whether Rejectin Under Section 1113 Creates a Claim
Somewhat amazingly, Congress did not clarify in section 1113
the answer to a question that is nothing less than fundamental:
Whether a court-approved rejection of a collective bargaining
agreement in bankruptcy gives union workers a right to damages.
In the world before section 1113, the answer to this question was
clear. If a Chapter 11 debtor rejected a collective bargaining agree-
ment, the rejection was governed by section 365, the Bankruptcy
Code's general provision on rejection of executory contracts.4
Section 365(g) provides that the rejection of an executory con-
tract in bankruptcy constitutes a breach of such contract, with
damages to be measured as if the breach had occurred immediately
before the filing. 145 Section 502(g), in turn, creates an exception to
the usual rule that claims must arise pre-petition in order to be
allowable in bankruptcy Section 502(g) provides that any claims
arising from the rejection of executory contracts shall be allowed
under section 502 just as if the claims had arisen before the date of
the filing of the bankruptcy 146
Since the enactment of section 1113, courts have not agreed on
the effect of a rejection of a collective bargaining agreement on the
claims of the workers who are covered by that agreement. Some
courts hold that because section 1113, unlike section 365, does not
specifically provide that rejection gives rise to a claim, then no
claim for rejection exists. 147 Further, these courts contend that al-
144. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 522 (1983).
145. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (1988).
146. Id. § 502(g).
147. See In re Blue Diamond Coal Co., 147 B.R. 720, 729-30 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1992)
(holding that when § 1113 was created it took collective bargaining agreements out of the
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lowing union workers a claim based on the rejection of their labor
contract would defeat the purpose of section 1113.148 The argu-
ment is that debtors can only reject labor agreements when doing
so is necessary to permit reorganization. If section 1113 allowed the
workers a claim for that rejection, however, then rejection itself
would prevent a successful reorganization by increasing signifi-
cantly the amount of unsecured claims against the debtor.149
Other courts have held that section 1113 was not meant to dis-
place completely the provisions of section 365 as applied to collec-
tive bargaining agreements, but merely to supplement the Code's
more general rules on the assumption or rejection of executory
contracts.150 Accordingly, these courts hold that the rules of sec-
tions 365(g) and 502(g), which applied before the enactment of sec-
tion 1113, should continue to govern these rejection cases, because
the rules of sections 365(g) and 502(g) are not inconsistent with
the provisions of section 1113.151
Even accepting the notion that the workers have a claim for re-
jection of a collective bargaining agreement does not resolve the
issue of how to define the size of that claim. A breach of contract
formula provides the answer to that question. In other words, the
workers' damage claim should be the difference between what the
workers were entitled to under the original collective bargaining
ambit of § 365 and that § 1113 did not provide an eqivalent to § 365(g)); In re Armstrong
Store Fixtures Corp., 139 B.R. 347, 350 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992) (holding that the net effect
of § 1113 was to remove labor contracts from the purview of § 365).
148. See Blue Diamond, 147 B.R. at 732.
149. Id. The court in Blue Diamond also coptended that the union could not be a creditor
nor hold a claim because of the limitations in § 101(10)'s definition of "creditor" (stating
that a creditor must hold a pre-petition claim or otherwise qualify under § 502(g)) and the
limitations in § 502(b) (stating that a court shall determine the amount of claims as of the
date of the filing of the petition). Id. at 732-33. In effect, the court simply was making the
point that § 365(g) would be the only route for the union to have a claim that arises as a
result of a post-petition rejection of a labor contract. Once § 365(g) is eliminated as a possi-
bility, there is really no other route for the union to qualify as a claimant.
150. See In re Texas Sheet Metals, Inc., 90 B.R. 260, 264 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988); see
also In re Maxwell Newspapers, Inc., 146 B.R. 920, 920 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) (dicta), rev'd on
other grounds, 149 B.R. 334 (S.D.N.Y.), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, 981 F.2d 85 (2d Cir.
1992); In re Indiana Grocery Co., 138 B.R. 40, 50 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1990) (dicta); In re
Garofalo's Finer Foods, Inc., 117 B.R. 363, 371 (Bankr. N.D. IlM. 1990) (dicta).
151. See Texas Sheet Metals, 90 B.R. at 273 (applying § 365(g) pursuant to its discussion
of § 1113)..
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agreement and what the workers actually receive for their work fol-
lowing the rejection of the agreement. 152
Applying this breach of contract standard to calculate damages
is not as simple as it sounds. At least one debtor raised the ques-
tion of whether this measure yields any damages at all for the dis-
appointed union workers. 153 The argument of this skeptical Chap-
ter 11 debtor was that if no rejection of the labor contract had
occurred, the debtor would have liquidated anyway and thus the
workers would not have received the higher wages that originally
were promised.154 The bankruptcy court refused to accept that ar-
gument, Instead making the rather circular argument that because
the debtor did not in fact liquidate, employment was available to
those employees whose collective bargaining agreement was
rejected. 155
A better response to the "no damages" argument is that it is
irrelevant that the debtor would have liquidated in the absence of
the court-sanctioned rejection of the labor contract. The real issue
in calculating damages in bankruptcy for rejected executory con-
tracts is simply determining the difference between what the
nondebtor actually receives given the rejection and what that
nondebtor party was entitled to receive under the rejected
contract.
The argument that the debtor would have been unable to per-
form the contract even in the absence of rejection is an argument
that will often be available in the bankruptcy setting. That reality,
however, has never caused courts to deny damage claims to
nondebtor parties under section 365(g) when the debtor rejects ex-
ecutory contracts outside the realm of collective bargaining agree-
ments. Nothing is distinctive about a collective bargaining agree-
ment that makes this "no damages" argument any less weak in
that context than the argument is in the typical executory contract
setting.
A separate issue concerning potential damages for rejection of a
labor contract is whether section 502(b)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code
152. See Indiana Grocery, 138 B.R. at 50.
153. See United States Truck Co. v. Teamsters Nat'l Freight Indus. Comm. (In re United
States Truck Co.), 89 B.R. 618 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988).




should apply to such a claim. That provision of the Code limits the
damages available to an employee for the debtor's termination of
an employment contract.156 The limit on the employee's claim
given in section 502(b)(7) is for one year's worth of compensation
that is provided for by the rejected employment contract. 157
The one district court that considered this issue held that the
section 502(b)(7) limit did not apply to the union's claim arising
from rejection of the collective bargaining agreement.158 The court
reasoned that the section 502(b)(7) limitation was intended to ap-
ply to employment contracts between individual employees and
the debtor rather than to a collective bargaining agreement that
encompassed the entire group of union workers.
1 59
On the question of whether a claim exists at all, it is rather hard
to believe that Congress intended, without expressly stating so,
that union workers should have no claim following a rejection. As
mentioned above, some courts contend that allowing a damage
claim in these cases would cause the very liquidation of the debtor
that the rejection of the labor contract was supposed to avoid.160
But that argument ignores the fact that any damage claim against
the estate will not be paid in real dollars, but instead will be paid
with the proverbial "ten-cent bankruptcy dollars." Put another
way, the issue of whether the union workers get a damage claim is
simply one of asset distribution. Resolution of that question will
determine whether the workers end up with a piece of the debtor's
pie at the expense of other general unsecured creditors. By con-
trast, the issue of whether the debtor should liquidate or reorgan-
ize is one of asset deployment.
The answer to the deployment question will not necessarily be
determined, as some courts seem to suggest, by the answer to the
distribution question. Whether union workers receive a larger piece
of the pie need not affect the question of whether its employer liq-
uidates or reorganizes. Certainly the deployment question should
not, as a normative matter, be driven by distributional concerns.
156. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(7) (1988).
157. Id.
158. United States Truck, 89 B.R. at 628.
159. Id.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 147-49.
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Ideally, the decision of whether the debtor's assets should re-
main together or be broken up is one that ought to be made by a
single owner or, in the alternative, by a group of claimants whose
collective judgment mimics that of a single owner.161 The best way
to ensure that the deployment decision of a creditor group will
mirror that of a single owner is to maintain the relative priorities
of the individual creditors no matter which deployment decision is
chosen. Thus, individual creditor priorities should not change de-
pending on whether the debtor is liquidated or reorganized.
As a general matter, the most effective way to avoid skewing the
deployment decisions of bankruptcy claimants as a group is to an-
swer the distribution question in bankruptcy with reference to
state law. In fact, bankruptcy law tends to take state law entitle-
ments and priorities as it finds them.162 This makes sense due to
the fact that if bankruptcy drastically reordered nonbankruptcy
entitlements, forum-shopping problems might result. 6 ' Claimants
who received a better relative deal inside of bankruptcy would
have an incentive to see their debtor in bankruptcy even if the
creditor group as a whole would be better served with a nonban-
kruptcy solution. This forum-shopping incentive, in turn, would
adversely affect an individual claimant's decision about the opti-
mal use of its debtor's assets.
In determining whether the union workers should have a claim
for rejection of their collective bargaining agreement, one must ask
whether the workers would have such a claim if the agreement
were rejected outside of bankruptcy In fact, the union workers
outside of bankruptcy would end up having something better than
just a claim for breach of contract-they would ultimately have the
ability to force their employer to comply with the labor agreement
161. See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the
Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured
Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CH. L. REv. 97, 118 (1984) (suggesting that a goal of bank-
ruptcy is to deploy the company's assets as a single owner would).
162. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54-56 (1979) (stating that absent federal
policy to the contrary, property rights in bankruptcy are defined by state law); see also
Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REv. 953, 953-59 (1981).
163. See Butner, 440 U.S. at 55 (asserting that an important reason for the uniform treat-




as well as to pay them any back wages due to the unilateral modifi-
cation or rejection.8 4
In one sense, then, in merely creating a mechanism for rejection
without union consent, section 1113 is already making union work-
ers worse off than they would be outside of bankruptcy There
seems to be no reason, in the absence of clear congressional intent,
to exacerbate what is already a potential forum-shopping problem
by denying the union workers any claim at all for their employer's
rejection of the collective bargaining contract.
C. The Unrejected, Unperformed Labor Contract
Reading the plain language of section 1113(f), one would never
guess that this seemingly straightforward rule would cause the
firestorm of controversy that recently has surrounded its interpre-
tation. Section 1113(f) states: "No provision of this title shall be
construed to permit a trustee to unilaterally terminate or alter any
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement prior to compliance
with the provisions of this section.' 1 65 At one level, this language
could be interpreted simply as reversing that part of the Supreme
Court's Bildisco decision that organized labor found to be the most
distasteful: the Court's holding that a debtor could unilaterally re-
ject a collective bargaining agreement without committing an un-
fair labor practice. 6
Instead, section 1113(f) has become the center of a priority bat-
tle. The case in which the controversy typically arises is one in
which the Chapter 11 debtor has not effected a formal rejection of
its labor contract, but nor has it complied with the terms of the
agreement. Workers who are owed wages and benefits under these
unrejected, unperformed labor agreements contend that any rights
they are owed should enjoy a superpriority status vis-h-vis the
rights of other claimants.
One line of cases holds that section 1113(f) has nothing to say
about the priority question and that any priority enjoyed by the
claims of union workers must be found, if it all, in the Code's gen-
164. See supra text accompanying notes 13-15.
165. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(f) (1988).
166. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527-34 (1984).
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eral priority provision, section 507 ' On the other side of the bat-
tle are cases that hold that section 1113(f)'s mandate against uni-
lateral termination of the labor contract prevails over any other
provision of the Code, including the Code's priority provisions.'68 A
debtor's failure to pay obligations under the unrejected agreement,
according to these courts, is tantamount to a unilateral termina-
tion or alteration of the contract by the debtor." 9
With the benefit of hindsight, Congress easily might have solved
this problem. One approach might have been to state directly in
section 1113(f) exactly what would happen if the debtor did unilat-
erally terminate or alter the contract. Thus, Congress might have
included a sentence that said, "Any rights of parties arising from
such a unilateral termination or alteration shall take priority in
distribution ahead of all parties except perfected secured
creditors."
Alternatively, Congress could have included within the Code's
priority provision, section 507, a subsection that referred to section
1113(f) claims and where they fit in. For example, Congress simply
could have added section 1113(f) claims to the category of claims
under section 507(a)(1) that are entitled to first priority among un-
secured claimants. Congress, of course, took neither of these ap-
proaches, leaving to the courts the question of what consequence
was intended when the debtor failed to abide by the rule of section
1113(f).
In addition to numerous lower court opinions, three circuit court
cases already have addressed in some way the puzzle of section
1113(f). In the first of these cases, United Steelworkers v. Unimet
Corp. (In re Unimet),'7 0 the debtor filed Chapter 11 at a time
when the only remaining obligation under its collective bargaining
167. See In re Roth American, Inc., 975 F.2d 949, 956 (3d Cir. 1992); Airline Pilots Ass'n
Int'l v. Shugrue (In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.), 154 B.R. 623, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); In re
Moline Corp., 144 B.R. 75, 78-79 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.), appeal denied, 1992 WL 245669 (N.D.
Ill. 1992); In re Armstrong Store Fixtures Corp., 135 B.R. 18, 22 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992).
168. See United Steelworkers v. Unimet Corp. (In re Unimet Corp.), 842 F.2d 879, 883
(6th Cir.), cert. dented, 488 U.S. 828 (1988); Metropolitan Distribution Servs., Inc. v. Local
153 OPEIU (In re Golden Distribs., Ltd.), 152 B.R. 35, 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Canton
Castings, Inc., 103 B.R. 874, 876 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1989).
169. See Unimet, 842 F.2d at 882.
170. 842 F.2d 879 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 828 (1988).
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agreement was to continue paying retiree medical premums.""'
Both the bankruptcy court and the district court had determined
that retirees were not employees for the purpose of section
1113(f)'s protection and that payment of the retiree premiums did
not otherwise qualify as an administrative expense priority.172
The Sixth Circuit in Unimet reversed the lower courts and noted
that section 1113(f) states clearly that no other part of the Bank-
ruptcy Code should be construed to allow the debtor unilaterally
to terminate or alter any proviswns of a collective bargaining
agreement prior to a formal rejection procedure. 73 Some subse-
quent cases have pointed to Unimet as supporting the proposition
that section 1113(f) claims should enjoy a superpriority status.174
Other courts, by contrast, have maintained just as steadfastly that
Unimet spoke not at all to the priority issue, but instead merely
addressed the question of whether retirees were entitled to the
protections of section 1113.175
In In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.,78 the collective bargaining
agreement in question included a clause that required certain dis-
putes between the union and its employer to be settled through
arbitration.'" The issue faced by the Second Circuit was whether
bankruptcy's automatic stay provision prohibited application of
the arbitration clause even though the collective bargaining agree-
ment that contained the clause had not been rejected yet by the
Chapter 11 debtor. The court held that the arbitration clause did
apply notwithstanding the automatic stay because of section
1113(f)'s mandate that no other provision of the Code should allow
the debtor unilaterally to terminate or alter the labor contract in
the absence of a formal rejection. 78 The court held that a failure
to abide by the arbitration clause constituted a unilateral modifica-
171. Id. at 880.
172. Id. at 881.
173. Id. at 883.
174. See, e.g., In re Golden Distribs., Ltd., 134 B.R. 760, 765 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991),
aff'd, 152 B.R. 35 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Canton Castings, Inc., 103 B.R. 874, 875 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1989).
175. See, e.g., In re Roth American, Inc., 975 F.2d 949, 957 n.10 (3d Cir. 1992).
176. 922 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 50 (1991).
177. Id. at 986.
178. Id. at 992.
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tion of the still-unrejected collective bargaining agreement in viola-
tion of section 1113(f).-79
As with Unimet, lower courts disagree about the effect of the
Ionosphere decision on the section 1113(f) priority question.180
Courts that hold in favor of a superpriority approach to section
1113(f) point to Ionosphere for the proposition that this subsection
does indeed trump all other provisions of the Code.18 Those courts
that do not believe section 1113(f) addresses priority issues at all
have distinguished Ionosphere on the basis that the conflict there
was between the automatic stay and section 1113(f) rather than
between the Code's priority provisions and section 1113(f). a82
The only circuit court decision to address the priority issue is In
re Roth American, Inc.8 3 That case involved an employer which
initially filed Chapter 11, never formally rejected its collective bar-
gaining agreement, and later liquidated piecemeal without having
confirmed a successful plan of reorganization.' In the aftermath
of the failed reorganization, the union argued that certain vacation
and severance pay claims of union workers, some of them pre-peti-
tion, were entitled to superpriority status by virtue of section
1113(f). 85
The Third Circuit in Roth denied the union's claim for superpri-
ority status except to the extent that the employees earned the
benefits sought during the post-petition period. 8 6 The court first
found no indication in the language or the legislative history of
section 1113 that Congress intended to address the priority of em-
ployees' claims for breaches of unrejected collective bargaining
agreements. 87 The court then contrasted section 1113(f) with the
179. Id. at 991.
180. See In re Armstrong Store Fixtures Corp., 135 B.R. 18, 20 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992);
In re Golden Distribs., Ltd., 134 B.R. 760, 763 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991), af'd, 152 B.R. 35
(S.D.N.Y. 1992).
181. See, e.g., Golden Distribs., 152 B.R. at 36.
182. See, e.g., In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 154 B.R. 623, 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (denying
priority and contending that the Second Circuit's Ionosphere opinion dealt solely with the
intersection of § 362 and § 1113(f)).
183. 975 F.2d 949 (3d Cir. 1992).
184. Id. at 950-52.
185. Id. at 951.




Code's section on retiree medical benefits, section 1114.188 Unlike
section 1113, section 1114 specifically provides that any payment
for retiree benefits required to be made under section 1114 will
enjoy the status of an administrative expense priority 189
If one is willing to go beyond the surface debate of whether the
unions are entitled to superpriority status, one can reconcile these
cases sensibly, despite the courts' professed disagreement with one
another. In order to appreciate this reconciliation, one first must
consider two different situations. Situation 1 involves a company
that is in Chapter 11 and is currently an ongoing business. The
company has a collective bargaining agreement that has not yet
been rejected. Imagine that this debtor is behind in payments that
it owes to union workers under the collective bargaining
agreement.
If the Chapter 11 debtor in Situation 1 wishes to confirm a plan
of reorganization, then it first must make good on all of its past
obligations under the collective bargaining agreement. Put another
way, this debtor cannot treat its labor contract as rejected without
formally rejecting it. In this first situation, one could argue that
the effect of section 1113(f) would be to give claims under such an
unrejected collective bargaining agreement a "superpriority" sta-
tus. These labor contract claims would achieve this status because
they would be paid in full, whereas certain other unsecured claims
outside of the collective bargaining agreement would receive less
than one hundred cents on the dollar.
Situation 2 involves a debtor that enters Chapter 11 at a time
when it owes past obligations under a still-existing collective bar-
gaining agreement. The debtor struggles along in Chapter 11 for a
few months, never paying these pre-petition obligations under the
collective bargaining agreement, and then finally is liquidated
piecemeal without having bothered to reject its labor contract. The
question then becomes what priority level the pre-petition claims
from the never-rejected labor agreement should have in the liqui-
dation of the debtor.
In cases that mirror Situation 2, unions have argued that section
1113(f) requires that those pre-petition claims receive a superpri-
188. Id. at 957-58.
189. 11 U.S.C. § 1114(e)(2) (1988).
5431994]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
ority status.190 Courts that disagree with the union in this type of
case apparently believe that their decisions do not follow courts
which have allowed a superpriority status to the claims in Situa-
tion 1. The truth is, a perfectly consistent interpretation of section
1113(f) would deny the priority claim in Situation 2 but would
grant it in Situation 1.
That interpretation views the provision as having nothing to do
with the relative priority among claimants as such. Rather, the role
of section 1113(f) is twofold: first, to overrule Bildisco's holding
that seemed to sanction a Chapter 11 debtor's unilateral rejection
of a collective bargaining agreement;19' and second, to serve as a
reminder to debtors that merely being in Chapter 11 does not give
them a license to ignore contractual commitments without follow-
ing the proper procedures for escaping them. 92 Seen in this light,
the proper remedy for a violation of section 1113(f) is an injunc-
tion. In other words, the debtor should not be able to emerge from
bankruptcy as an ongoing business unless and until it has either
properly rejected its collective bargaining agreement or completely
fulfilled all of the obligations thereunder.
Going back to Situation 1, the reason that the union workers
should be paid is that the court's injunction is enforced as a pre-
requisite to allowing confirmation of the debtor's plan of reorgani-
zation. The injunction in that first situation means that the reorga-
nizing debtor must comply, as section 1113(f) requires, with the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement that it never formally
rejected.
In Situation 2, the reason that the workers should not get their
pre-petition claims paid in full is that the injunction of section
1113(f) has no meaning when no ongoing entity survives against
which to enforce it. A Chapter 11 confirmation hearing can serve as
an appropriate point for the court to force the debtor's compliance
190. See, e.g., Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Shugrue (In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.), 154
B.R. 623, 627-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); In re Ohio Corrugating Co., 115 B.R. 572, 574-78 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1990), rev'd sub nom. United Steelworkers v. Ohio Corrugating Co., 1991 WL
213850 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 3, 1991).
191. In re Armstrong Store Fixtures Corp., 135 B.R. 18, 21 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992).
192. Sumitomo Trust & Banking Co. v. Holly's, Inc. (In re Holly's, Inc.), 140 B.R. 643,
682 (W.D. Mich. 1992).
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with an unrejected collective bargaining agreement. 93 In Situation
2, the Chapter 11 debtor never made it to that point and therefore
was never forced to comply with the injunction.
Note that even in Situation 2, in which the debtor liquidates, the
union workers should get an administrative priority for any obliga-
tions they are owed that relate to work performed during the
Chapter 11 case. That result, however, has nothing to do with sec-
tion 1113(f). Instead, the administrative priority received by the
workers would be a function of their fulfilling the requirements of
section 503(b). That section defines an administrative expense as
any "actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the es-
tate. ' 194 Expenses owed by the debtor for work performed during
the post-petition period routinely qualify for this priority 195
To create yet a third situation, Situation 3, suppose that a
debtor enters Chapter 11 at a time when the debtor owes certain
pre-petition obligations under its still-existing collective bargaining
agreement. Imagine that the debtor continues its operations in
Chapter 11 for several months, and during that time fails to honor
certain post-petition obligations under the labor contract. The
debtor then successfully rejects the collective bargaining agreement
under the provisions of section 1113.
In Situation 3, the union workers' pre-petition claims under the
now-rejected collective bargaining agreement should receive no
special priority Certainly the workers' claims for any post-petition
obligations under the agreement should qualify for priority to the
extent that they otherwise qualify as administrative expense
claims.19 6 But union workers in this situation have argued that sec-
tion 1113(f) should give a priority status to both the pre-petition
and the post-petition obligations of the debtor under the collective
bargaining agreement. 197
The argument of the union in this third type of case is that sec-
tion 1113(f) causes in effect a "deemed assumption" by the Chap-
ter 11 debtor of the collective bargaining agreement, at least up
193. See Ohi Corrugating, 1991 WL 213850 at *1-2.
194. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (1988).
195. See In re Roth American, Inc., 120 B.R. 356 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1990), affl'd, 975 F.2d
949 (3d Cir. 1992); In re Chicago Lutheran Hosp. Assoc., 75 B.R. 854 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987).
196. See supra text accompanying notes 194-95.
197. See In re Roth American, Inc., 975 F.2d 949, 954-55 (3d Cir. 1992).
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until the point of the labor contract's proper rejection.19 8 During
that period of deemed assumption, the argument goes, all of the
union workers' pre-petition claims under the agreement assume
the status of administrative expense priorities. 99 That is, in fact,
the result that would occur if the debtor actually assumed an exec-
utory contract. Section 365(b) is clear that a debtor wishing to as-
sume an executory contract in default ultimately must pay in full
the amount of any pre-petition defaults as a prerequisite to as-
sumption of the contract. 00
Applying the section 365(b) rule of affirmative contract assump-
tion to these temporary "default assumptions" would, however,
lead to a number of undesirable results. First, it would prevent
even the most diligent debtor from shedding obligations that stem
strictly from its pre-bankruptcy past. One of the most fundamental
principles of bankruptcy is that a debtor should be able to create
upon filing bankruptcy a clear cleavage between its past and its
future dealings with third parties. 0 Under the approach to section
1113(f) advocated by the union, even if the Chapter 11 debtor took
just one week to effect a proper rejection of its labor contract, all
pre-petition obligations owed by the debtor to the union would in-
stantly become priority claims upon the debtor's Chapter 11 filing.
The second flaw in the argument for giving superpriority status
to pre-petition collective bargaining claims is that the union work-
ers' priority would then depend largely on the fortuity of whether
its employer initially filed for a Chapter 11 or a Chapter 7 bank-
ruptcy The placement of section 1113 in only Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code is at least reasonably logical. If a company is liq-
uidating under Chapter 7 rather than reorganizing under Chapter
11, the need for a debtor to "reject" the company's collective bar-
gaining agreement disappears.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 955-56.
200. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(A) (1988) (providing that one condition to a debtor's ability to
assume a pre-petition contract that is in default is that debtor "cures, or provides adequate
assurance that the [debtor] will promptly cure, such default").
201. See id. § 301 (a voluntary bankruptcy case commences immediately upon filing a
petition); id. § 362(a) (the automatic stay becomes effective immediately upon filing); td.
§ 541(a)(1) (property of the estate defined to include all legal or equitable interests of
debtor in property "as of the commencement of the case"); id. § 727(b) (bankruptcy dis-
charge affects all debts which arose before commencement of the case).
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If section 1113(f) is construed as creating a priority for pre-peti-
tion obligations under a collective bargaining agreement, then it
creates a priority that exists in Chapter 11 only The existence of
such a Chapter l-only priority could skew, at the margin, the de-
cision of either the company or its creditors about which bank-
ruptcy chapter would best maximize the value of the company's
assets. Put another way, allowing a Chapter 11-only priority would
cause the asset distribution question to drive the asset deployment
question. As discussed earlier, these two decisions ought to be in-
dependent of one another.20 2
The other problem with construing section 1113(f) to create a
Chapter 11-only priority is that it would have the ironic effect of
giving creditors other than union workers much greater leverage in
determining whether the debtor's Chapter 11 plan should be con-
firmed. The operation of the "best interests of creditors" test
would accomplish this result. The best interests test, as mentioned
before, essentially requires that every creditor receive as much in
the Chapter 11 plan as the same creditor would receive if the com-
pany were liquidated under Chapter 7 203
If the union workers received a priority in Chapter 11 but not
Chapter 7 for their pre-petition claims under the collective bar-
gaining agreement, then creditors who were not union workers
would receive relatively less in Chapter 11 than if the company
liquidated in Chapter 7 Of course, the debtor possibly could be
worth so much more as a going-concern in Chapter 11 than it
would be if liquidated in Chapter 7, that the creditors who were
not union workers would still be better off with the company in
Chapter 11 than in Chapter 7
If, however, the company's "going-concern surplus" were less
than the amount of the union workers' Chapter 11-only priority
claims, the other creditors could block the proposed Chapter 11
plan by invoking the "best interests" test. The union workers
could remove this leverage from the other creditors only by giving
back wage concessions to the Chapter 11 company that were suffi-
cient to make the other creditors as well off as they would be if the
company were in Chapter 7 Even if this bargaining came to a suc-
202. See supra text accompanying notes 160-63.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 133-34.
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cessful conclusion, the negotiation itself would add yet a new cost




When considering the wisdom of section 1113 in the abstract, it
probably makes sense to ask whether and how that provision
changes the nonbankruptcy rules that govern an employer's rela-
tionship with its union workers. As noted earlier, the NLRA pro-
vides that existing labor agreements can only be modified or termi-
nated through a process involving notice and bargaining. 05 This
rule, in fact, is fairly similar to the result under the more elaborate
standard set down in section 1113.
The question then becomes whether section 1113, given that it
more or less approximates the rules under nonbankruptcy law, in-
cluding a separate provision in the Bankruptcy Code to state that
fact, ensures any independent benefit. Certainly courts would be
more efficient if they simply would translate nonbankruptcy enti-
tlements into the bankruptcy forum. On the other hand, if section
1113 was intended to create a rejection standard that is truly dif-
ferent from that which exists under nonbankruptcy law, a forum-
shopping problem could well arise from such a reordering of
nonbankruptcy entitlements.
As this Article has explored, case law since the enactment of.sec-
tion 1113 has been less than clear about how that Code provision
changes the set of nonbankruptcy rules that govern the modifica-
tion of collective bargaining agreements. Ironically, of course, one
of Congress' primary motivations for enactment of section 1113
was to clarify what the labor contract rejection standard ought to
be in the wake of the Bildisco opinion. Instead of bringing clarity,
however, section 1113 has simply created additional provisions re-
sulting in significant litigation.
Even before section 1113, the Bankruptcy Code included the
fundamental provisions that could provide a framework for deter-
204. The administrative costs of a typical Chapter 11 reorganization in which a creditors'
committee is appointed have been estimated at $100,000. See Douglas G. Baird, The Un-
easy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127, 135 n.13 (1986).
205. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13.
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mining the ability of a Chapter 11 debtor to reject a collective bar-
gaining agreement. Indeed, the main dispute that arose with the
use of section 365 to govern the rejection of labor contracts was
just how great a hardship that the debtor had to show in order for
a court to allow rejection under that section. Today, with the addi-
tion of section 1113, that very same tension remains, albeit in dif-
ferent clothes.
The fundamental dispute regarding what level of hardship the
debtor needs to show for rejection of a collective bargaining agree-
ment simply has shifted from section 365 to the definition of "nec-
essary" in section 1113. As this Article has demonstrated, section
1113's failure to resolve the primary unsettled issue that existed
prior to its enactment is not its most troubling aspect. Besides fail-
ing to solve old problems, section 1113 created new ones that did
not and could not exist in the world before section 1113.
In addition to the "necessary" debate, the two main section 1113
questions that occupy the case law today had no real analogues
before that provision's enactment. The issue of whether union
workers should have a claim for rejection of a collective bargaining
agreement in a pre-1113 setting was easy to resolve. Section 365(g)
provides unambiguously that any rejection of an executory con-
tract under that provision gives rise to a claim for damages.20 6 Sim-
ilarly, the superpriority issue that has arisen under section 1113(f)
is solely a function of the imprecise language of section 1113(f).
One other significant point questions the need for a separate sec-
tion 1113. Union workers' greatest leverage in bargaining with their
employer, both inside and outside of bankruptcy, remains the same
in the section 1113 world as it did in the pre-Bildisco days: the
ability to strike. With or without section 1113, the union workers'
employer can never modify or reject its labor contract with com-
plete impunity because of employees' ability to vote with their
feet.207 Given the existence of that simple but effective bargaining
tool, one is left to wonder whether the bells and whistles of section
1113 have in fact been worth that provision's tremendous costs.
206. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (1988).
207. See In re Kentucky Truck Sales, Inc., 52 B.R. 797, 806 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985) (not-
ing that even following a court-sanctioned rejection of the collective bargaining agreement,
union workers retain their right to strike as "their ultimate bargaining tool").
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